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To learn how cognition is implemented in the brain, we must build computational models that can 
perform cognitive tasks, and test such models with brain and behavioral experiments. Cognitive 
science has developed computational models of human cognition, decomposing task performance 
into computational components. However, its algorithms still fall short of human intelligence and are 
not grounded in neurobiology. Computational neuroscience has investigated how interacting neurons 
can implement component functions of brain computation. However, it has yet to explain how those 
components interact to explain human cognition and behavior. Modern technologies enable us to 
measure and manipulate brain activity in unprecedentedly rich ways in animals and humans. However, 
experiments will yield theoretical insight only when employed to test brain-computational models. It is 
time to assemble the pieces of the puzzle of brain computation. Here we review recent work in the 
intersection of cognitive science, computational neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. 
Computational models that mimic brain information processing during perceptual, cognitive, and 
control tasks are beginning to be developed and tested with brain and behavioral data. 
 
Understanding brain information processing requires that we build computational models that are capable of 
performing cognitive tasks. The argument in favor of task-performing computational models was well 
articulated by Allen Newell in his commentary “You can’t play 20 questions with nature and win” in 1973.1 
Newell was criticizing the state of cognitive psychology. The field was in the habit of testing one hypothesis 
about cognition at a time, in the hope that forcing nature to answer a series of binary questions would 
eventually reveal the brain’s algorithms. Newell argued that testing verbally defined hypotheses about 
cognition might never lead to a computational understanding. Hypothesis testing, in his view, needed to be 
complemented by the construction of comprehensive task-performing computational models. Only synthesis in 
a computer simulation can reveal what the interaction of the proposed component mechanisms actually entails, 
and whether it can account for the cognitive function in question. If we did have a full understanding of an 
information-processing mechanism, then we should be able to engineer it. “What I cannot create, I do not 
understand” in the words of physicist Richard Feynman, who left this sentence on his blackboard when he died 
in 1988. 
Here we argue that task-performing computational models that explain how cognition arises from 
neurobiologically plausible dynamic components will be central to a new cognitive computational neuroscience. 
We first briefly trace the steps of the cognitive and brain sciences and then review several exciting recent 
developments that suggest that it might be possible to meet the combined ambitions of cognitive science (to 
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explain how humans learn and think)2 and computational neuroscience (to explain how brains adapt and 
compute)3 using neurobiologically plausible artificial intelligence (AI) models. 
In the spirit of Newell’s critique, the transition from cognitive psychology to cognitive science was defined by 
the introduction of task-performing computational models. Cognitive scientists knew that understanding 
cognition required AI and brought engineering to cognitive studies. In the 1980s, cognitive science achieved 
important advances with symbolic cognitive architectures4, 5 and neural networks,6 using human behavioral 
data to adjudicate between candidate computational models. However, computer hardware and machine 
learning were not sufficiently advanced to simulate cognitive processes in their full complexity. Moreover, these 
early developments relied on behavioral data alone and did not leverage constraints provided by the anatomy 
and activity of the brain. 
With the advent of human functional brain imaging, scientists began to relate cognitive theories to the human 
brain. This endeavor started with electroencephalography (EEG),7 expanded with magnetoencephalography 
(MEG)8 and positron emission tomography (PET), and exploded with the invention of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI).9 It came to be called cognitive neuroscience.10 
Cognitive neuroscientists began by mapping cognitive psychology’s boxes (information-processing modules) 
and arrows (interactions between modules) onto the brain. This was a step forward in terms of engaging brain 
activity, but a step back in terms of computational rigor. Methods for testing the task-performing computational 
models of cognitive science with brain-activity data had not been conceived. As a result, cognitive science and 
cognitive neuroscience parted ways in the 1990s. 
Cognitive psychology’s tasks and theories of high-level functional modules provided a reasonable starting point 
for mapping the coarse-scale organization of the human brain with functional imaging techniques, including 
EEG, PET and early fMRI, which had low spatial resolution. Inspired by cognitive psychology’s notion of 
module,11 cognitive neuroscience developed its own game of 20 questions with nature. A given study would 
ask whether a particular cognitive module could be found in the brain. The field mapped an ever increasing 
array of cognitive functions to brain regions, providing a useful rough draft of the global functional layout of the 
human brain. 
Brain mapping enables us to relate the performance of a task to activity all over the brain, using statistical 
inference techniques that account for the multiple testing across locations.12 As imaging technology advances, 
increasingly detailed patterns of selectivity can be mapped across the brains of humans and animals. In 
humans, fMRI affords up to whole-brain coverage at resolutions on the order of a millimeter; in animals, 
modern techniques, such as calcium imaging, can capture vast numbers of neurons with single-neuron 
resolution. 
A brain map, at whatever scale, does not reveal the computational mechanism (Figure 1). However, mapping 
does provide constraints for theory. After all, information exchange incurs costs that scale with the distance 
between the communicating regions – costs in terms of physical connections, energy, and signal latency. 
Component placement is likely to reflect these costs. We expect regions that need to interact at high bandwidth 
and short latency to be placed close together.13 More generally, the topology and geometry of a biological 
neural network constrain its dynamics, and thus its functional mechanism. The literature on functional 
localization results, especially in combination with anatomical connectivity, may therefore ultimately prove 
useful for modeling brain information processing. 
Modern meta-analysis techniques for brain imaging data enable us to go beyond localization of predefined 
cognitive components and learn about the way cognition is decomposed into component functions.14 The field 
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has also gone beyond associating overall activation of brain regions with their involvement in particular 
functions. A growing literature aims to reveal the representational content of brain regions by analyzing their 
multivariate patterns of activity.15,16,17,18  
Despite methodological challenges,19,20 many of the findings of cognitive neuroscience provide a solid basis to 
build on. For example, the findings of face-selective regions in the human ventral stream21 have been 
thoroughly replicated and generalized.22 Nonhuman primates probed with fMRI exhibited similar face-selective 
regions,23 which had evaded explorations with invasive electrodes, because the latter do not provide 
continuous images over large fields of view. Localized with fMRI and probed with invasive electrode 
recordings, the primate face patches revealed high densities of face-selective neurons,24 with invariances 
emerging at higher stages of hierarchical processing, including mirror-symmetric tuning and view-tolerant 
representations of individual faces in the anterior-most patch.25 The example of face perception illustrates, on 
one hand, the solid progress in mapping the anatomical substrate and characterizing neuronal responses 26 
and, on the other, the lack of definitive computational models. The literature does provide clues to the 
computational mechanism. A brain-computational model of face recognition27 will have to explain the spatial 
clusters of face-selective units and the selectivities and invariances observed with fMRI28,29 and invasive 
recordings.25,30 
Cognitive neuroscience has mapped the global functional layout of the human and nonhuman primate brain.31 
However, it has not achieved a full computational account of brain information processing. The challenge 
ahead is to build computational models of brain information processing that are consistent with brain structure 
and function and perform complex cognitive tasks. The following recent developments in cognitive science, 
computational neuroscience, and artificial intelligence suggest that this may be achievable. 
(1) Cognitive science has proceeded from the top down, decomposing complex cognitive processes into their 
computational components. Unencumbered by the need to make sense of brain data, it has developed task-
performing computational models at the cognitive level. One success story is that of Bayesian cognitive 
models, which optimally combine prior knowledge about the world with sensory evidence.32,33,34,35 Initially 
applied to basic sensory and motor processes,35,36 Bayesian models have begun to engage complex cognition, 
including the way our minds model the physical and social world.2 These developments occurred in interaction 
with statistics and machine learning, where a unified perspective on probabilistic empirical inference has 
emerged. This literature provides essential computational theory for understanding the brain. In addition, it 
provides algorithms for approximate inference on generative models that can grow in complexity with the 
available data – as might be required for real-world intelligence.37,38,39 
(2) Computational neuroscience has taken a bottom-up approach, demonstrating how dynamic interactions 
between biological neurons can implement computational component functions. In the past two decades, the 
field developed mathematical models of elementary computational components and their implementation with 
biological neurons.40,41 These include components for sensory coding,42,43 normalization,44 working memory,45 
evidence accumulation and decision mechanisms,46,47,48 and motor control.49 Most of these component 
functions are computationally simple, but they provide building blocks for cognition. Computational 
neuroscience has also begun to test complex computational models that can explain high-level sensory and 
cognitive brain representations.50,51  
(3) Artificial intelligence has shown how component functions can be combined to create intelligent behavior. 
Early AI failed to live up to its promise, because the rich world knowledge required for feats of intelligence 
could not be either engineered or automatically learned. Recent advances in machine learning, boosted by 
growing computational power and larger data sets to learn from, have brought progress at perceptual,52 
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cognitive,53 and control challenges.54 Many advances were driven by cognitive-level symbolic models. Some of 
the most important recent advances are driven by deep neural network models, composed of units that 
compute linear combinations of their inputs, followed by static nonlinearities.55 These models employ only a 
small subset of the dynamic capabilities of biological neurons, abstracting from fundamental features such as 
action potentials. However, their functionality is inspired by brains and could be implemented with biological 
neurons. 
The three disciplines contribute complementary elements to biologically plausible computational models that 
perform cognitive tasks and explain brain information processing and behavior (Figure 2). Here we review the 
first steps in the literature toward a cognitive computational neuroscience that meets the combined criteria for 
success of cognitive science (computational models that perform cognitive tasks and explain behavior) and 
computational neuroscience (neurobiologically plausible mechanistic models that explain brain activity). If 
computational models are to explain animal and human cognition, they will have to perform feats of 
intelligence. Machine learning and AI more broadly are therefore key disciplines that provide the theoretical 
and technological foundation for cognitive computational neuroscience. 
The overarching challenge is to build solid bridges between theory (instantiated in task-performing 
computational models) and experiment (providing brain and behavioral data). The first part of this article 
describes bottom-up developments that begin with experimental data, and attempt to build bridges from the 
data in the direction of theory.56 Given brain-activity data, connectivity models aim to reveal the large-scale 
dynamics of brain activation; decoding and encoding models aim to reveal the content and format of brain 
representations. The models employed in this literature provide constraints for computational theory, but they 
do not in general perform the cognitive tasks in question and, thus, fall short of explaining the computational 
mechanism underlying task performance. 
The second part of this article describes developments that proceed in the opposite direction, building bridges 
from theory to experiment.57,50,51 We review emerging work that has begun to test task-performing 
computational models with brain and behavioral data. The models include cognitive models, specified at an 
abstract computational level, whose implementation in biological brains has yet to be explained, and neural 
network models, which abstract from many features of neurobiology, but could plausibly be implemented with 
biological neurons. This emerging literature suggests the beginnings of an integrative approach to 
understanding brain computation, where models are required to perform cognitive tasks, biology provides the 
admissible component functions, and the computational mechanisms are optimized to explain detailed patterns 
of brain activity and behavior. 
 
From experiment toward theory 
Models of connectivity and dynamics 
One path from measured brain activity toward a computational understanding is to model the brain’s 
connectivity and dynamics. Connectivity models go beyond the localization of activated regions and 
characterize the interactions between regions. Neuronal dynamics can be measured and modeled at multiple 
scales, from local sets of interacting neurons to whole-brain activity.58 A first approximation of brain dynamics 
is provided by the correlation matrix among the measured response time series, which characterizes the 
pairwise “functional connectivity” between regions. The literature on resting-state networks has explored this 
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approach59, and linear decompositions of the space-time matrix, such as spatial independent component 
analysis, similarly capture simultaneous correlations between locations across time.60 
By thresholding the correlation matrix, the set of regions can be converted into an undirected graph and 
studied with graph-theoretical methods. Such analyses can reveal “communities” (sets of strongly interacting 
regions), “hubs” (regions connected to many others) and “rich clubs” (communities of hubs).61,62 Connectivity 
graphs can be derived either from anatomical or functional measurements. The anatomical connectivity matrix 
typically resembles the functional connectivity matrix, because regions interact through anatomical pathways. 
However, the way anatomical connectivity generates functional connectivity is better modeled by taking local 
dynamics, delays, indirect interactions, and noise into account.63 From local neuronal interactions to large-
scale spatiotemporal patterns spanning cortex and subcortical regions, generative models of spontaneous 
dynamics can be evaluated with brain-activity data.  
 
 
Figure 1 | Modern imaging techniques provide unprecedentedly detailed information about neuronal activity, but 
data-driven analyses support only limited insights. (a) Two-photon calcium imaging results from 191 showing single-
neuron activity for a large population of cells measured simultaneously in larval zebrafish while the animals interacted with 
a virtual environment. (b) Human fMRI results from 99 reveal a detailed map of semantically selective responses while a 
subject listened to a story. These results illustrate the power of modern brain-activity measurement techniques and the 
challenge of drawing insights about brain computation from such data sets. Both studies measured brain activity during 
complex, time-continuous, naturalistic experience and used linear models (principal component analysis, inset in a, bottom) 
to provide an overall view of the activity patterns and their representational significance. 
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Effective connectivity analyses take a more hypothesis-driven approach, characterizing the interactions among 
a small set of regions on the basis of generative models of the dynamics. Dynamic Causal Modeling (DCM), for 
example, can address questions about causal interactions. The analysis typically focuses on a small set of 
regions that show task-dependent changes.64 Granger causality65 and transfer entropy66 analyses attempt to 
infer causal influences based on time series data, by assessing whether considering the past activity of region 
X boosts prediction of the current activity of region Y, beyond what can be achieved on the basis of the past 
activity of Y. Effective connectivity analysis usually involves specifying a set of candidate graphical models, 
each expressing a hypothesis about the causal interactions between regions, and selecting the model that is 
most consistent with the data. 
While activation mapping maps the boxes of cognitive psychology onto brain regions, effective connectivity 
analyses map the arrows onto pairs of brain regions. Most work in this area has focused on characterizing 
interactions at the level of the overall activation of a brain region. Like the classical brain mapping approach, 
these analyses are based on regional-mean activation, measuring correlated fluctuations of overall regional 
activation rather than the information exchanged between regions. Relating fine-grained pattern information 
between pairs of regions is also beginning to be explored (e.g. 67). 
Both dynamic models of the whole brain and effective connectivity models of subsets of regions provide 
potentially meaningful high-level descriptions of the interactions that give rise to brain dynamics. The variation 
of dynamical states can be studied within individuals (e.g. across states of consciousness68) and across 
individuals (e.g. to understand the changes associated with disorders69). 
Analyses of effective connectivity and large-scale brain dynamics go beyond generic statistical models like the 
linear models used in activation and information-based brain mapping in that they are generative models: they 
can generate data at the level of the measurements and are models of brain dynamics. However, they do not 
capture the information exchanged or the processing occurring in the brain. 
 
Decoding models 
Another path toward understanding the brain’s computational mechanisms is to reveal what information is 
present in each brain region. Decoding models take brain-activity patterns as input and output what is 
interpreted as the mental content represented in a brain region.18,70,71 Decoding can help us go beyond the 
notion of activation, which indicates the involvement of a region in a task, and reveal the information present in 
a region’s population activity. When particular content is decodable from a brain region, this indicates the 
presence of the information. To refer to the brain region as “representing” the content adds a functional 
interpretation72: that the information serves the purpose to inform regions receiving these signals about the 
content. Ultimately, this interpretation needs to be substantiated by further analyses of how the information 
affects other regions and behavior.73,74,75,76 
Decoding has its roots in the neuronal-recording literature77,40 and has become a popular tool for studying the 
content of representations in neuroimaging.78,18,70,79,71,80 In the simplest case, decoding reveals which of two 
stimuli gave rise to a measured response pattern. The content of the representation can be the identity of a 
sensory stimulus (to be recognized among a set of alternative stimuli), a stimulus property (such as the 
orientation of a grating), an abstract variable needed for a cognitive operation, or an action81. When the 
decoder is linear, as is usually the case, the decodable information is in a format that can plausibly be read out 
by downstream neurons in a single step. Such information is said to be explicit in the activity patterns.73,73,82 
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Decoding models enable us to read out the orientation of a visual stimulus from early visual cortex,16 object 
categories from ventral stream areas,15,83 face identity from anterior temporal areas,28,25 and belief-related 
decisions from ventromedial prefrontal areas.84 Decoding studies have also contributed to our understanding of 
attention,16,85 and working memory.86 The literature goes far beyond these examples and has been repeatedly 
reviewed.70,80,78,73 
A particularly impressive form of decoding is stimulus reconstruction.87,88,89 Like ordinary decoding, 
reconstruction maps brain activity patterns to stimuli. However, the space of stimuli that can be decoded is 
much more complex (e.g. all natural images) and the decoding model must generalize not just to new 
measurements for the same stimuli, but to new stimuli. This requires that the model capture something more 
general about the relationship between stimulus and multivariate response. 
Decoding and other types of multivariate pattern analysis have helped reveal the content of regional 
representations,78,18,70,71,80 providing evidence that brain-computational models must incorporate. However, the 
ability to decode particular information does not amount to a full account of the neuronal code: It doesn’t 
specify the representational format (beyond linear decodability) or what other information might additionally be 
present. Most importantly, decoders do not in general constitute models of brain computation. They reveal 
aspects of the product, but not the process of brain computation. 
 
Representational models 
Decoders enable us to test for the presence of particular information in a brain region. Ultimately, we would like 
to exhaustively characterize a region’s representation, explaining its responses to arbitrary stimuli. A full 
characterization would also define to what extent any variable can be decoded. Representational models 
attempt to make comprehensive predictions about the representational space and therefore provide stronger 
constraints on the computational mechanism than decoding models.90,74 
Three types of representational model analysis have been introduced in the literature: encoding models91,92, 93 
pattern component models (PCM),94 and representational similarity analysis (RSA).95,79,96 These three methods 
all test hypotheses about the representational space, which are based on multivariate descriptions of the 
experimental conditions, e.g. a semantic description of a set of stimuli, or the activity patterns across a layer of 
a neural network model that processes the stimuli.74  
In encoding models, each voxel’s activity profile across stimuli is predicted as a linear combination of the 
features of the model. In PCM, the distribution of the activity profiles that characterizes the representational 
space is modeled as a multivariate normal distribution. In RSA, the representational space is characterized by 
the representational dissimilarities of the activity patterns elicited by the stimuli. Mathematically, these three 
techniques of representational modeling are closely related in that they all test hypotheses about the 
representational space defined by the second moment of the activity profiles.74 All three techniques consider 
two sets of representational features equivalent if they share the same second moment and, thus, generate the 
same representational space – providing the same information to downstream regions (but see 97). 
Representational models are often defined on the basis of descriptions of the stimuli, such as labels provided 
by human observers.91,98,98,99 In this scenario, a representational model that explains the brain responses in a 
given region provides, not a brain-computational account, but at least a descriptive account of the 
representation. Such an account can be a useful stepping stone toward computational theory when the model 
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generalizes to novel stimuli. Importantly, representational models also enable us to adjudicate among brain-
computational models, an approach we will return to in the next section. 
In this section, we considered three types of model that can help us glean computational insight from brain-
activity data. Connectivity models capture aspects of the dynamic interactions between regions. Decoding 
models enable us to look into brain regions and reveal what might be their representational content. 
Representational models enable us to test explicit hypotheses that fully characterize a region’s 
representational space. All three types of model can be used to address theoretically motivated questions – 
taking a hypothesis-driven approach. However, in the absence of task-performing computational models, they 
are subject to Newell’s argument that asking a series of questions might never reveal the computational 
mechanism underlying the cognitive feat we are trying to explain. These methods fall short of building the 
bridge all the way to theory, because they do not test mechanistic models that specify precisely how the 
information processing underlying some cognitive function might work. 
 
 
  
Figure 2 | What does it mean to understand how the brain works? The goal of cognitive computational neuroscience is  
to explain rich measurements of neuronal activity and behavior in animals and humans by means of biologically plausible 
computational models that perform real-world cognitive tasks. Historically, each of the disciplines (circles) has tackled a 
subset of these challenges (white labels). Cognitive computational neuroscience strives to meet all the criteria 
simultaneously. 
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Box 1: The many meanings of model 
The word model has many meanings in the brain and behavioral sciences. Data-analysis models are generic 
statistical models that help establish relationships between measured variables. Examples include linear 
correlation, univariate multiple linear regression for brain mapping, and linear decoding analysis. Effective 
connectivity and causal-interaction models are, similarly, data-analysis models. They help us infer causal 
influences and interactions between brain regions. Data-analysis models can serve the purpose to test 
hypotheses about relationships among variables (e.g. correlation, information, causal influence). They are not 
models of brain information processing. A box-and-arrow model, by contrast, is an information-processing 
model in the form of labeled boxes that represent cognitive component functions and arrows that represent 
information flow. In cognitive psychology, such models provided useful, albeit ill-defined, sketches for theories 
of brain computation. A word model, similarly, is a sketch for a theory about brain information processing that 
is defined vaguely by a verbal description. These are models of information processing, but do not perform the 
information processing thought to occur in the brain. An oracle model is a model of brain responses (often 
instantiated in a data-analysis model) that relies on the availability of information, such as semantic properties 
or category labels, that are not available to the animal whose brain is being modeled. For example, a model of 
ventral temporal visual responses as a function of an abstract shape description, or as a function of category 
labels or continuous semantic features constitutes an oracle model, if the model is not capable of computing 
the shape, category or semantic features from images. An oracle model may provide a useful characterization 
of the information present in a region and its representational format, without specifying any theory as to how 
the representation is computed by the brain. A brain-computational model (BCM), by contrast, is a model 
that mimics the brain information processing underlying the performance of some task at some level of 
abstraction. In visual neuroscience, for example, an image-computable model is a BCM of visual processing 
that takes image bitmaps as inputs and predicts brain activity and/or behavioral responses. Deep neural nets 
provide image-computable models of visual processing. However, deep neural nets trained by supervision rely 
on category-labeled images for training. Because labeled examples are not available (in comparable 
quantities) during biological development and learning, these models are BCMs of visual processing, but they 
are not BCMs of development and learning. Reinforcement learning models use environmental feedback 
that is more realistic in quality and can provide BCMs of learning processes. A sensory encoding model is a 
BCM of the computations that transform sensory input to some stage of internal representation. An internal-
transformation model is a BCM of the transformation of representations between two stages of processing. A 
behavioral decoding model is a BCM of the transformation from some internal representation to a behavioral 
output. Note that the label BCM indicates merely that the model is intended to capture brain computations at 
some level of abstraction. A BCM may abstract from biological detail to an arbitrary degree, but must predict 
some aspect of brain activity and/or behavior. Psychophysical models that predict behavioral outputs from 
sensory input and cognitive models that perform cognitive tasks are BCMs formulated at a high level of 
description. The label BCM does not imply that the model is either plausible or consistent with empirical data. 
Progress is made by rejecting candidate BCMs on empirical grounds. Like micro-scale biophysical models, 
which capture biological processes that underlie brain computations, and macro-scale brain-dynamical and 
causal-interaction models, BCMs are models of processes occurring in the brain. However, unlike the other 
types of process model, BCMs perform the information processing that is thought to be the function of brain 
dynamics. Finally, the term model is used to refer to models of the world employed by the brain, as in model-
based reinforcement learning and model-based cognition. 
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From theory to experiment 
To build a better bridge between experiment and theory, we first need to fully specify a theory. This can be 
achieved by defining the theory mathematically and implementing it in a computational model (Box 1). 
Computational models can reside at different levels of description, trading off cognitive fidelity against 
biological fidelity (Figure 3). Models designed to capture only neuronal components and dynamics100 tend to be 
unsuccessful at explaining cognitive function101 (Figure 3, horizontal axis). Conversely, models designed to 
capture only cognitive functions are difficult to relate to the brain (Figure 3, vertical axis). To link mind and 
brain, models must attempt to capture aspects of both behavior and neuronal dynamics. Recent advances 
suggest that constraints from the brain can help explain cognitive function,55,102,103 and vice versa,50,51turning 
the tradeoff into a synergy. 
In this section, we focus on recent successes with task-performing models that explain cognitive functions in 
terms of representations and algorithms. Task-performing models have been central to psychophysics and 
cognitive science, where they are traditionally tested with behavioral data. An emerging literature is beginning 
to test task-performing models also with brain-activity data. We will consider two broad classes of model in 
turn, neural network models and cognitive models. 
 
Neural network models 
Neural network models (Box 2) have a long history with interwoven strands in multiple disciplines. In 
computational neuroscience, neural network models, at various levels of biological detail, have been essential 
to understanding dynamics in biological neural networks and elementary computational functions.40,41 In 
cognitive science, they defined a new paradigm for understanding cognitive functions called parallel distributed 
processing in the 1980s,6,104 which brought the field closer to neuroscience. In AI, they have recently brought 
substantial advances in a number of applications,55,103 ranging from perceptual tasks (such as vision and 
speech recognition) to symbolic processing challenges (such as language translation), and on to motor tasks 
(including speech synthesis and robotic control). Neural network models provide a common language for 
building task-performing models that meet the combined criteria for success of the three disciplines (Figure 2). 
Like brains, neural network models can perform feedforward as well as recurrent computations.50,106 The 
models driving the recent advances are deep in the sense that they comprise multiple stages of linear-
nonlinear signal transformation. Models typically have millions of parameters (the connection weights), which 
are set so as to optimize task performance. One successful paradigm is supervised learning, where a desired 
mapping from inputs to outputs learned from a training set of inputs (e.g. images) and associated outputs (e.g. 
category labels). However, neural network models can also be trained without supervision and can learn 
complex statistical structure inherent to their experiential data. 
The large number of parameters creates unease among researchers who are used to simple models with small 
numbers of interpretable parameters. However, simple models will never enable us to explain complex feats of 
intelligence. The history of AI has shown that intelligence requires ample world knowledge, and sufficient 
parametric complexity to store it. We therefore must engage complex models (Figure 3) and the challenges 
they pose. One challenge is that the high parameter count renders the models difficult to understand. Because 
the models are entirely transparent, they can be probed cheaply with millions of input patterns to understand 
the internal representations, an approach sometimes called “synthetic neurophysiology”. To address the 
concern of overfitting, models are evaluated in terms of their generalization performance. A vision model, for  
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Box 2: Neural network models 
The term neural network model has come to be associated with a class of model that is inspired by biological 
neural networks in that each unit combines many inputs and information is processed in parallel through a 
network. In contrast to biologically detailed models, which may capture action potentials and dynamics in 
multiple compartments of each neuron, these models abstract from the biological details. However, they can 
explain certain cognitive functions, such as visual object recognition, and therefore provide an attractive 
framework for linking cognition to the brain. 
A typical unit computes a linear combination of its inputs and passes the result through a static nonlinearity. 
The output is sometimes interpreted as analogous to the firing rate of a neuron. Even shallow networks (those 
with a single layer of hidden units between inputs and outputs) can approximate arbitrary functions.105 
However, deep networks (those with multiple hidden layers) can more efficiently capture many of the complex 
functions needed in real-world tasks. Many applications, e.g. in computer vision, use feedforward architectures. 
However, recurrent neural networks, which reprocess the outputs of their units and generate complex 
dynamics, have brought additional engineering advances106 and better capture the recurrent signaling in 
brains.107,108,48,109 Whereas feedforward networks are universal function approximators, recurrent networks are 
universal approximators of dynamical systems.110 Recurrent processing enables a network to recycle its limited 
computational resources through time, so as to perform more complex sequences of computations. Recurrent 
networks can represent the recent stimulus history in a dynamically compressed format, providing the temporal 
context information needed for current processing. As a result, recurrent networks can recognize, predict, and 
generate dynamical patterns. 
Neural network models learn their parameters. Both feedforward and recurrent networks are defined by their 
architecture and the setting of the connection weights. One way to set the weights is through iterative small 
adjustments that bring the output closer to some desired output (supervised learning). Each weight is adjusted 
in proportion to the reduction in the error that a small change to it would yield. This method is called gradient 
descent, because it produces steps in the space of weights along which the error declines most steeply. 
Gradient descent can be implemented using backpropagation, an efficient algorithm for computing the 
derivative of the error function with respect to each weight. 
Whether the brain uses an algorithm like backpropagation for learning is controversial. Several biologically 
plausible implementations of backpropagation or closely related forms of supervised learning have been 
suggested.111,112,113 Supervision signals might be generated internally114 on the basis of the context provided by 
multiple sensory modalities, on the basis of the dynamic refinement of representations over time, as more 
evidence becomes available from the senses and from memory115, and on the basis of internal and external 
reinforcement signals arising in interaction with the environment.116 Reinforcement learning54 and unsupervised 
learning of neural network parameters117,118 are areas of rapid current progress. 
Neural network models have demonstrated that taking inspiration from biology can yield breakthroughs in AI. It 
seems likely that the quest for models that can match human cognitive abilities will draw us deeper into the 
biology.185 The abstract neural network models currently most successful in engineering could be implemented 
with biological hardware. However, they only use a small subset of the dynamical components of brains. 
Neuroscience has described a rich repertoire of dynamical components, including action potentials,165 
canonical microcircuits186, dendritic dynamics,187,111,113 and network phenomena,40 such as oscillations,188 
which may have computational functions. Integrating these dynamical components into computational models 
designed to perform meaningful tasks promises to reveal their computational function in the brain and may 
drive further advances in AI. 
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example, will be evaluated in terms of its ability to predict neural activity and behavioral responses for images it 
has not been trained on. 
Several recent studies have begun to test neural network models as models of brain information 
processing.50,51 These studies used deep convolutional neural network models trained to recognize objects in 
images to predict brain representations of images in the primate ventral visual stream. Results have shown 
that the internal representations of deep convolutional neural networks provide the best current models of 
representations of visual images in inferior temporal (IT) cortex in humans and monkeys.119,120,121 When 
comparing large numbers of models, those that were optimized to perform the task of object classification 
better explained the IT representation.119,120 
Early layers of deep neural networks trained to recognize objects contain representations resembling early 
visual cortex.120,122 As we move gradually along the ventral visual stream, higher layers of the neural networks 
gradually come to provide a better basis for explaining the representations.122,123,124 Higher layers of deep 
convolutional neural networks also resemble the IT cortical representation in that both enable the decoding of 
object position, size, and pose, along with the category of the object.125 In addition to testing these models by 
predicting brain-activity data, the field has begun to test them by predicting behavioral responses reflecting 
perceived shape126 and object similarity.127  
 
Cognitive models 
Models at the cognitive level enable researchers to envision the information processing without simultaneously 
having to tackle its implementation with neurobiologically plausible components. This enables progress on 
domains of higher cognition, where neural network models still fall short. Moreover, a cognitive model may 
provide a useful abstraction, even when a process can also be captured with a neural network model. 
Neuroscientific explanations now dominate for functional components closer to the periphery of the brain 
where sensory and motor processes connect the animal to its environment. However, much of higher-level 
cognition has remained beyond the reach of neuroscientific accounts and neural network models. From its 
early days, cognitive science has built task-performing models using symbolic representations. These models 
explained high-level cognitive processes including judgments, problem solving, and planning. To illustrate 
some of the unique contributions of cognitive models, we briefly discuss three classes of cognitive model: 
production systems, reinforcement learning models, and Bayesian cognitive models. 
Production systems provide an early example of a class of cognitive models that can explain reasoning and 
problem solving. These models use rules and logic, and are symbolic in that they operate on symbols rather 
than sensory data and motor signals. They capture cognition, rather than perception and motor control, which 
ground cognition in the physical environment. A production is a cognitive action triggered according to an if-
then rule. A set of such rules specifies the conditions (“if”) under which each of a range of productions (“then”) 
is to be executed. The conditions refer to current goals and knowledge in memory. The actions can modify the 
internal state of goals and knowledge. For example, a production may create a subgoal or store an inference. If 
conditions are met for multiple rules, a conflict resolution mechanism chooses one production. A model 
specified using this formalism will generate a sequence of productions, which may to some extent resemble 
our conscious stream of thought while working toward some cognitive goal. The formalism of production 
systems also provides a universal computational architecture.133 Production systems such as ACT-R 5 were 
originally developed under the guidance of behavioral data. More recently such models have also begun to be 
tested in terms of their ability to predict regional-mean fMRI activation time courses.134 
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Reinforcement learning (RL) models capture how an agent can learn to maximize its long-term cumulative 
reward through interaction with its environment.128  As in production systems, RL models often assume that the 
agent has perception and motor modules that enable the use of discrete symbolic representations of states 
and actions. The agent chooses actions, observes resulting states of the environment, receives rewards along 
the way, and learns to improve its behavior. The agent may learn a value function associating each state with 
its expected cumulative reward. If the agent can predict which state each action leads to, and if it knows the 
values of those states, then it can choose the most promising action. The agent may also learn a policy that 
associates each state directly with promising actions. The choice of action must balance exploitation (which 
brings short-term reward) and exploration (which benefits learning and brings long-term reward). 
The field of RL explores algorithms that define how to act and learn, so as to maximize cumulative reward. 
With roots in psychology and neuroscience, RL theory is now an important field of machine learning and AI. It 
provides a very general perspective on control that includes the classical techniques dynamic programming, 
Monte Carlo and exhaustive search as limiting cases, and can handle challenging scenarios, where the 
environment is stochastic and only partially observed, and its causal mechanisms are unknown. 
An agent might exhaustively explore an environment and learn the most promising action to take in any state 
by trial and error (model-free control). This would require sufficient time to learn, enough memory, and an 
environment that does not kill the agent prematurely. Biological organisms, however, have limited time to learn 
and limited memory, and they are not free to explore interactions that might kill them. Under these conditions, 
an agent might do better to build a model of its environment. A model can compress and generalize experience 
to enable intelligent action in novel situations (model-based control). Model-free methods are computationally 
efficient (mapping from states to values or directly to actions), but statistically inefficient (learning takes long); 
model-based methods are more statistically efficient, but may require prohibitive amounts of computation (to 
simulate possible futures).135  
Until experience is sufficient to build a reliable model, an agent might do best to simply store episodes and 
revert to paths of action that have met with success in the past (episodic control).136,137 Storing episodes 
preserves sequential dependency information important for model building. Moreover, episodic control enables 
the agent to exploit such dependencies even before understanding the causal mechanism supporting a 
successful path of action. 
The brain is capable of each of these three modes of control (model-free, model-based, episodic)138 and 
appears to combine their advantages using an algorithm that has yet to be discovered. AI and computational 
neuroscience share the goal to discover this algorithm,139,140,141,54,53,130,142,135 although they approach this goal 
from different angles. This is an example of how a cognitive challenge can motivate the development of formal 
models and drive progress in AI and neuroscience. 
A third and critically important class of cognitive model is that of Bayesian models (Box 3).33,35,36,34,143,144,145,32 
Bayesian inference provides an essential normative perspective on cognition. It tells us what a brain should 
compute for an animal to behave optimally. Perceptual inference, for example, should consider the current 
sensory data in the context of prior beliefs. Bayesian inference simply refers to combining the data with prior 
beliefs according to the rules of probability. 
Bayesian models have contributed to our understanding of basic sensory and motor processes.33,35,36,34 They 
have also provided insights into higher cognitive processes of judgment and decision making, explaining 
classical cognitive biases154 as the product of prior assumptions, which may be incorrect in the experimental 
task, but correct and helpful in the real world. 
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With Bayesian nonparametric models, cognitive science has begun to explain more complex cognitive abilities. 
Consider the human ability to induce a new object category from a single example. Such inductive inference 
requires prior knowledge of a kind not captured by current feedforward neural network models.156 To induce a 
category, we rely on an understanding of the object, of the interactions among its parts, of how they give rise to 
its function. In the Bayesian cognitive perspective, the human mind, from infancy, builds mental models of the 
world.2  These models may not only be generative models in the probabilistic sense, but may be causal and 
compositional, supporting mental simulations of processes in the world using elements that can be re-
composed to generalize to novel and hypothetical scenarios.145,2,157 This modeling approach has been applied 
to our reasoning about the physical158,157,159 and even the social160 world. 
Generative models are an essential ingredient of general intelligence. An agent attempting to model all 
relationships among the data does not require external supervision or reinforcement to learn. Unsupervised 
learning greatly expands the amount of exploitable data, enabling the agent to mine all its experiences to 
understand its environment and itself. In particular, causal models of processes in the world (how objects 
cause images, how the present causes the future) can give an agent a deeper understanding and, thus, a 
better basis for inferences and actions. 
The representation of probability distributions in neuronal populations has been explored theoretically and 
experimentally.161,162 However, relating Bayesian inference and learning, especially structure learning in 
nonparametric models, to its implementation in the brain remains challenging.163 As theories of brain 
computation, approximate inference algorithms like sampling may explain cortical feedback signals and activity 
correlations.144,164,165,166,167 Moreover, the corners cut by the brain for computational efficiency, the 
approximations, may explain human deviations from statistical optimality. In particular, cognitive experiments 
have revealed signatures of sampling168 and amortized inference169 in human behavior. 
Cognitive models, including the three classes highlighted here, decompose cognition into meaningful functional 
components. By declaring their models independent of the implementation in the brain, cognitive scientists are 
able to address high-level cognitive processes144,32,145 that are beyond the reach of current neural networks 
(but see 170). Cognitive models are essential for cognitive computational neuroscience because they enable us 
to see the whole as we attempt to understand the roles of the parts. 
The fact that cognitive models are not restricted to neurobiologically plausible components is both a strength 
and a weakness. It enables them to capture complex cognitive phenomena, but makes them difficult to relate 
to neural network models and measurements of brain activity. Cognitive models are sometimes tested with 
human functional imaging data. Such tests compare predictions about the time course of certain signals of 
interest at the coarse scale of regional-mean activation.134,171,138 A challenge for the future is to test cognitive 
models at the level of the representational content being processed – as is beginning to happen for neural 
networks in the framework of representational models.50,51 For example, we should be able to predict 
representations of particular pieces of cognitive content, such as the current or currently simulated state of the 
environment. To the extent that we can make neural predictions from cognitive algorithms or, conversely, 
derive algorithmic models from neural dynamics, we will be able to leverage cognitive models to understand 
the brain. 
Bayesian cognitive models have recently flourished in interaction with machine learning and statistics. Early 
work used generative models with a fixed structure that were flexible only with respect to a limited set of 
parameters. Modern generative models can grow in complexity with the data and discover their inherent 
structure.145 They are called nonparametric, because they are not limited by a predefined finite set of 
parameters.155 Their parameters can grow in number without any predefined bound.  
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Box 3: Bayesian cognitive models 
Bayesian cognitive models are motivated by the assumption that the brain approximates the statistically 
optimal solution to a task. The statistically optimal way to make inferences and decide what to do is to interpret 
the current evidence in light of all available prior knowledge using the rules of probability. Consider the case of 
visual perception. The retinal signals reflect the objects in the world, which we would like to recognize. To infer 
the objects, we should consider what configurations of objects we deem possible and how well each explains 
the image. Our prior beliefs are represented by a generative model that captures the probability of each 
configuration of objects and the probabilities with which a given configuration would produce different retinal 
images. 
More formally, a Bayesian model of vision might use a generative model of the joint distribution p(d, c) of the 
sensory data d (the image) and the causes in the world c (the configuration of surfaces, objects, and light 
sources to be inferred).146 The joint distribution p(d, c) equals the product of the prior p(c) over all possible 
configurations of causes and the likelihood p(d|c), the probability of a particular image given a particular 
configuration of causes. A prescribed model for p(d|c) would enable us to evaluate the likelihood, the 
probability of a specific image d given causes c. Alternatively, we might have an implicit model for p(d|c) in the 
form of a stochastic mapping from causes c to data d (images). Such a model would generate natural images. 
Whether prescribed or implicit, the model of p(d|c) captures how the causes in the world create the image, or 
at least how they relate to the image. Visual recognition amounts to computing the posterior p(c|d), the 
probability distribution over the causes given a particular image. The posterior p(c|d) reveals the causes c as 
they would have to exist in the world to explain the sensory data d.147 A model computing p(c|d) is called a 
discriminative model, because it discriminates among images – here mapping from effects (the image) to the 
causes. The inversion mathematically requires a prior p(c) over the latent causes. The prior p(c) can constrain 
the interpretation and help reduce the ambiguity resulting from the multiple configurations of causes that can 
account for any image. 
Basing the inference of the causes c on a generative model of p(d, c) that captures all available knowledge 
and uncertainty is statistically optimal, but computationally challenging (i.e. it may require more neurons or time 
than the animal can use).. Ideally, the generative model p(d, c) implicit to the inference p(c|d) should capture 
our knowledge not just about image formation, but also the things in the world and their interactions, and our 
uncertainties about these processes. One challenge is to learn a generative model from sensory data. We 
need to represent the learned knowledge and the remaining uncertainties. If the generative model is 
misspecified, then the inference will not be optimal. For real-world tasks, some degree of misspecification of 
the model is inevitable. For example, the generative model may contain an overly simplified version of the 
image-generation process. Another challenge is the computation of the posterior p(c|d). For realistically 
complex generative models, the inference may require computation-intensive iterative algorithms such as 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), belief propagation (BP), or variational inference. The brain’s compromise 
between statistical and computational efficiency,149,150,151 may involve learning fast feedforward recognition 
models that speed up frequent component inferences, crystallizing conclusions that are costly to fluidly derive 
with iterative algorithms. This is known as amortized inference.152,153 
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Figure 3 | The space of process models. Models of the processes taking place in the brain can be defined at different 
levels of description and can vary in their parametric complexity (dot size) and in their biological (horizontal axis) and 
cognitive (vertical axis) fidelity. Theoreticians approach modeling with a range of primary goals. The bottom-up approach 
to modeling (blue arrow) aims first to capture characteristics of biological neural networks, such as action potentials and 
interactions among multiple compartments of single neurons. This approach disregards cognitive function, so as to focus 
on understanding the emergent dynamics of small parts of the brain, such as cortical columns and areas, and to 
reproduce biological network phenomena, such as oscillations. The top-down approach (red arrow) aims first to capture 
cognitive functions at the algorithmic level. This approach disregards the biological implementation, so as to focus on 
decomposing the information processing underlying task performance into its algorithmic components. The two 
approaches form the extremes of a continuum of paths toward the common goal to explain how our brains give rise to our 
minds. Overall there is tradeoff (negative correlation) between cognitive and biological fidelity. However, the tradeoff can 
turn into a synergy (positive correlation) when cognitive constraints illuminate biological function, and when biology 
inspires models that explain cognitive feats. Because intelligence requires rich world knowledge, models of human brain 
information processing will have high parametric complexity (large dot in the upper right corner). Even if models that 
abstract from biological details can explain task performance, biologically detailed models will still be needed to explain 
the neurobiological implementation. This diagram is a conceptual cartoon that can help us understand the relationships 
between models and appreciate their complementary contributions. However, it is not based on quantitative measures of 
cognitive fidelity, biological fidelity, and model complexity. Definitive ways to measure each of the three variables have yet 
to be developed. Figure inspired by 192.  
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Box 4: Why do cognitive science, computational neuroscience, and AI need each 
other? 
Cognitive science needs computational neuroscience, not merely to explain the implementation of cognitive 
models in the brain, but also to discover the algorithms. For example, the dominant models of sensory 
processing and object recognition are brain-inspired neural networks, whose computations are not easily 
captured at a cognitive level. Recent successes with Bayesian nonparametric models do not yet in general 
scale to real-world cognition. Explaining the computational efficiency of human cognition and predicting 
detailed cognitive dynamics and behavior could benefit from studying brain-activity dynamics. Explaining 
behavior is essential, but behavioral data alone provide insufficient constraints for complex models. Brain data 
can provide rich constraints for cognitive algorithms if leveraged appropriately. Cognitive science has always 
progressed in close interaction with artificial intelligence. The disciplines share the goal of building task-
performing models and thus rely on common mathematical theory and technologies. 
Computational neuroscience needs cognitive science to challenge it to engage higher-level cognition. At the 
experimental level, the tasks of cognitive science enable computational neuroscience to bring cognition into the 
lab. At the level of theory, cognitive science challenges computational neuroscience to explain how the 
neurobiological dynamical components it studies contribute to cognition and behavior. Computational 
neuroscience needs AI, and in particular machine learning, to provide the theoretical and technological basis 
for modeling cognitive functions with biologically plausible dynamical components. 
Artificial intelligence needs cognitive science to guide the engineering of intelligence. Cognitive science’s 
tasks can serve as benchmarks for AI systems, building up from elementary cognitive abilities to artificial 
general intelligence. The literatures on human development and learning provide an essential guide to what is 
possible for a learner to achieve and what kinds of interaction with the world can support the acquisition of 
intelligence. AI needs computational neuroscience for algorithmic inspiration. Neural network models are an 
example of a brain-inspired technology that is unrivalled in several domains of AI. Taking further inspiration 
from the neurobiological dynamical components (e.g. spiking neurons, dendritic dynamics, the canonical 
cortical microcircuit, oscillations, neuromodulatory processes) and the global functional layout of the human 
brain (e.g. subsystems specialized for distinct functions, including sensory modalities, memory, planning, motor 
control) might lead to additional AI breakthroughs. Machine learning draws from separate traditions in statistics 
and computer science, which have optimized statistical and computational efficiency, respectively. The 
integration of computational and statistical efficiency is an essential challenge in the age of big data. The brain 
appears to combine computational and statistical efficiency and understanding its algorithm might boost 
machine learning. 
 
Looking ahead 
Bottom up and top down 
The brain seamlessly merges bottom-up discriminative and top-down generative computations in perceptual 
inference, and model-free and model-based control. Brain science likewise needs to integrate its levels of 
description and progress both bottom-up and top-down, so as to explain task performance on the basis of 
neuronal dynamics and provide a mechanistic account of how the brain gives rise to the mind. 
Bottom-up visions, proceeding from detailed measurements toward an understanding of brain computation, 
have been prominent and have driven the most important recent funding initiatives. The European Human 
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Brain Project and the U.S. BRAIN Initiative are both motivated by bottom-up visions, in which an understanding 
of brain computation is achieved by measuring and modeling brain dynamics with a focus on the circuit level. 
The BRAIN Initiative seeks to advance technologies for measuring and manipulating neuronal activity. The 
Human Brain Project attempts to synthesize neuroscience data in biologically detailed dynamic models. Both 
initiatives proceed primarily from experiment toward theory, and from the cellular level of description to larger-
scale phenomena. 
Measuring large numbers of neurons simultaneously and modeling their interactions at the circuit level will be 
essential. The bottom-up vision is grounded in the history of science. Microscopes and telescopes, for 
example, have brought scientific breakthroughs. However, it is always in the context of prior theory (generative 
models of the observed processes) that better observations advance our understanding. In astronomy, for 
example, the theory of Copernicus guided Galileo in interpreting his telescopic observations. 
Understanding the brain requires that we develop theory and experiment in tandem, and complement the 
bottom-up, data-driven approach by a top-down, theory-driven approach that starts with behavioral functions to 
be explained.172,173 Unprecedentedly rich measurements and manipulations of brain activity will drive 
theoretical insight when they are used to adjudicate between brain-computational models that pass the first 
test of being able to perform a function that contributes to the behavioral fitness of the organism. The top-down 
approach, therefore, is an essential complement to the bottom-up approach toward understanding the brain 
(Figure 3). 
 
Integrating Marr’s levels 
Marr (1982) offered a distinction of three levels of analysis: (1) computational theory, (2) representation and 
algorithm, and (3) neurobiological implementation.174 Cognitive science starts from computational theory, 
decomposing cognition into components and developing algorithms from the top down. Computational 
neuroscience proceeds from the bottom up, composing neuronal building blocks into representations and 
algorithms thought to be useful components in the context of the brain’s overall goal to control behavior. AI 
builds representations and algorithms that combine simple components to implement complex feats of 
intelligence. All three disciplines, thus, converge on the algorithms and representations of the brain and mind, 
contributing complementary constraints. 
Marr’s levels provide a useful guide to the challenge of understanding the brain. However, they should not be 
taken to suggest that cognitive science need not consider the brain, or that computational neuroscience need 
not consider cognition (Box 4). Marr was inspired by computers, which are designed by human engineers to 
precisely conform to high-level algorithmic descriptions. This enables the engineers to abstract from the circuits 
when designing the algorithms. Even in computer science, however, certain aspects of the algorithms depend 
on the hardware, such as its parallel processing capabilities. Brains differ from computers in ways that 
exacerbate this dependence. Brains are the product of evolution and development, processes that are not 
constrained to generate systems whose behavior can be perfectly captured at some abstract level of 
description. It may therefore not be possible to understand cognition without considering its implementation in 
the brain or, conversely, to make sense of neuronal circuits, except in the context of the cognitive functions 
they support. 
For an example of a challenge that transcends the disciplines, consider a child seeing an escalator for the first 
time. She will rapidly recognize people on steps traveling upward obliquely. She might think of it as a moving 
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staircase and imagine riding on it, being lifted one story without exerting any effort. She might infer its function 
and form a new concept on the basis of a single experience, before ever learning the word “escalator”. 
Deep neural network models provide a biologically plausible account of the rapid recognition of the elements of 
the visual experience (people, steps, oblique upward motion, handrail). They can explain the computationally 
efficient pattern recognition component.55 However, they cannot explain yet how the child understands the 
relationships among the elements, the physical interactions of the objects, the people’s goal to go up, and the 
function of the escalator, or how she can imagine the experience and instantly form a new concept. 
Bayesian nonparametric models explain how deep inferences and concept formation from single experiences 
are even possible. They may explain the brain’s stunning statistical efficiency, its ability to infer so much from 
little data by building generative models that provide abstract prior knowledge.145 However, current inference 
algorithms require large amounts of computation and, as a result, do not yet scale to real-world challenges like 
forming the new concept “escalator” from a single visual experience. 
On a 20-Watt power budget, the brain’s algorithms combine statistical and computational efficiency in ways 
that are beyond current AI of either the Bayesian or the neural network variety. However, recent work in AI and 
machine learning has begun to explore the intersection between Bayesian inference and neural network 
models, combining the statistical strengths of the former (uncertainty representation, probabilistic inference, 
statistical efficiency) with the computational strengths of the latter (representational learning, universal function 
approximation, computational efficiency).175,170,117  In cognitive science, analysis-by-synthesis models of visual 
recognition, which use iterative fitting of a generative graphics model to the image, have been complemented 
with discriminative neural networks that provide rapid feedforward estimates. 27,176,177 Generative neural 
network models are also a long-standing178, 179,180 and now quickly growing area of research.118,117 The 
intersection between probabilistic inference and neural network models seems poised for further 
breakthroughs that could impact brain and cognitive theory as well as AI. 
More generally, neural network models can be integrated with other techniques that have complementary 
strengths. For example, neural network models can be trained by RL54 and integrated with classical AI 
techniques.181,130 Neural networks can also be enhanced with more stable memory components.182,183 This 
addresses the need for memory at different time scales and is inspired by the theory of complementary 
learning systems in the brain.184 
Integrating all three of Marr’s levels will require close collaboration among researchers with a wide variety of 
expertise. It is difficult for any single lab to excel at neuroscience, cognitive science, and AI-scale 
computational modeling. We therefore need collaborations between labs with complementary expertise. In 
addition to conventional collaborations, an open science culture, in which components are shared between 
disciplines, can help us integrate Marr’s levels. Shareable components include cognitive tasks, brain and 
behavioral data, computational models, and tests that evaluate models by comparing them to biological 
systems (Box 5). 
The study of the mind and brain is entering a particularly exciting phase. Recent advances in computer 
hardware and software enable AI-scale modeling of the mind and brain. If cognitive science, computational 
neuroscience, and artificial intelligence can come together, we might be able to explain human cognition with 
neurobiologically plausible computational models. 
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Box 5: Shareable tasks, data, models, and tests – a new culture of 
multidisciplinary collaboration 
Neurobiologically plausible models that explain cognition will have substantial parametric complexity. Building 
and evaluating such models will require machine learning, and big brain and behavioral data sets. Traditionally, 
each lab has developed its own tasks, data sets, models, and tests with a focus on the goals of its own 
discipline. To scale these efforts up to the challenge, we will need to develop tasks, data, models, and tests 
that are relevant across the three disciplines and shared among labs (Figure). A new culture of collaboration 
will assemble big data and big models by combining components from different labs. To meet the conjoined 
criteria for success of cognitive science, computational neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, the best 
division of labor might cut across the traditional disciplines. 
Tasks: By designing experimental tasks, we carve up cognition into components that can be quantitatively 
investigated. A task is a controlled environment for behavior. It defines the dynamics of a task “world” that 
provides sensory input (e.g. visual stimuli) and captures motor output (e.g. button press, joystick control, or 
higher-dimensional limb or whole-body control). Tasks drive the acquisition of brain and behavioral data and 
the development of AI models, providing well-defined challenges and quantitative performance benchmarks for 
comparing models. The ImageNet tasks,189 for example, have driven substantial progress in computer vision. 
Tasks should be designed and implemented such that they can readily be used in all three disciplines to drive 
data acquisition and model development (related developments include: OpenAI’s Gym, 
https://gym.openai.com, and Universe, https://universe.openai.com; and DeepMind’s Lab193). The spectrum of 
useful tasks includes classical psychophysical tasks employing simple stimuli and responses as well as 
interactions in virtual realities. As we engage all aspects of the human mind, our tasks will need to simulate 
natural environments and will come to resemble computer games. This may bring the added benefit of mass 
participation and big behavioral data, especially when tasks are performed via the web.190  
Data: Behavioral data acquired during task performance provides overall performance estimates and detailed 
signatures of success and failure, of reaction times and movement trajectories. Brain-activity measurements 
characterize the dynamic computations underlying task performance. Anatomical data can characterize the 
structure and connectivity of the brain at multiple scales. Structural brain data, functional brain data, and 
behavioral data will all be essential for constraining computational models. 
Models: Task-performing computational models can take sensory inputs and produce motor outputs, so as to 
perform experimental tasks. AI-scale neurobiologically plausible models can be shared openly and tested in 
terms of their task performance and in terms of their ability to explain a variety of brain and behavioral data 
sets, including new data sets acquired after definition of the model. Initially, many models will be specific to 
small subsets of tasks. Ultimately, models must generalize across tasks. 
Tests: To assess the extent to which a model can explain brain information processing during a particular task, 
we need tests that compare models and brains on the basis of brain and behavioral data. Every brain is 
idiosyncratic in its structure and function. Moreover, for a given brain, every act of perception, cognition, and 
action is unique in time and cannot be repeated precisely because it permanently changes the brain in 
question. These complications make it challenging to compare brains and models. We must define the 
summary statistics of interest and the correspondence mapping between model and brain in space and time at 
some level of abstraction. Developing appropriate tests for adjudicating among models and determining how 
close we are to understanding the brain is not merely a technical challenge of statistical inference. It is a 
conceptual challenge fundamental to theoretical neuroscience. 
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The interaction among labs and disciplines can benefit from adversarial cooperation.118 Cognitive researchers 
who feel that current computational models fall short of explaining an important aspect of cognition are 
challenged to design shareable tasks and tests that quantify these shortcomings, and to provide human 
behavioral data to set the bar for AI models. Neuroscientists who feel that current models do not explain brain 
information processing are challenged to share brain-activity data acquired during task performance and tests 
comparing activity patterns between brains and models to quantify the shortcomings of the models. Although 
we will have a plurality of definitions of success, translating these into quantitative measures of the quality of a 
model is essential and could drive progress in cognitive computational neuroscience as well as engineering. 
 
Figure | Interactions among shareable components. Tasks, data, models, and tests are components (gray nodes) that 
lend themselves to sharing among labs and across disciplines, to enable collaborative construction and testing of big models 
driven by big brain and behavioral data sets assembled across labs. 
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